Roger Cadenhead over at the Workbench wrote up his analysis of one of our Long Bets yesterday that is up for review (thanks to Chris Anderson for sending this in). Cory Doctorow over at BoingBoing also did a nice write up. We here at Long Bets will be making our own analysis of course, but here is a good excerpt of his take on it:

So Winer wins the bet 3-2, but his premise of blog triumphalism is challenged by the fact that on all five stories, a major U.S. media outlet ranks above the leading weblog in Google search. Also, the results for the top story of the year reflect poorly on both sides.

In the five years since the bet was made, a clear winner did emerge, but it was neither blogs nor the Times.

Wikipedia, which was only one year old in 2002, ranks higher today on four of the five news stories: 12th for Chinese exports, fifth for oil prices, first for the Iraq war, fourth for the mortgage crisis and first for the Virginia Tech killings.

Winer predicted a news environment “changed so thoroughly that informed people will look to amateurs they trust for the information they want.” Nisenholtz expected the professional media to remain the authoritative source for “unbiased, accurate, and coherent” information.

Instead, our most trusted source on the biggest news stories of 2007 is a horde of nameless, faceless amateurs who are not required to prove expertise in the subjects they cover.

And I just saw that Winer and Boutin have wrote up their takes on this:

My Long Bet with Martin Nisenholtz
It certainly is fun to speculate, but the decision about who won
belongs exclusively to the Long Now Foundation. They have
to decide who determines what the top stories of 2007 are, and
imho they should consult with search experts to …
Scripting News – http://www.scripting.com/

Wikipedia wins, I lose big bet on the news
By Paul Boutin
Google — the company, not the search engine — will call a
winner, and the Long Now Foundation, which holds the
cash in the pot, will decide the issue. I know because I set this
all up in 2001, by talking to Google PR chief David Krane …
serversatoz.com – http://serversatoz.com/

I was recently reminded of this great prediction article by John Watkins published in the 01900 Ladies Home Journal.

Particularly interesting for how much it gets right and wrong, sometimes in the same prediction. Some examples of the 29 predictions:

• There will be air-ships, but they will not successfully compete with surface cars and water vessels for passenger or freight traffic. They will be maintained as deadly war-vessels by all military nations. Some will transport men and goods. Others will be used by scientists making observations at great heights above the earth.

• Photographs will be telegraphed from any distance. If there be a battle in China a hundred years hence snapshots of its most striking events will be published in the newspapers an hour later. Even to-day photographs are being telegraphed over short distances. Photographs will reproduce all of Nature’s colors.

• There will be No C, X or Q in our every-day alphabet. They will be abandoned because unnecessary. Spelling by sound will have been adopted, first by the newspapers. English will be a language of condensed words expressing condensed ideas, and will be more extensively spoken than any other. Russian will rank second.

You can see an image of the actual article here, or a transcribed text version here.

Futarchy is an untried form of government proposed by economist Robin Hanson, in which officials define measures of national welfare while prediction markets determine which policies are most desirable. In Hanson’s words, “we would vote on values, but bet on beliefs.”

Futarchy is based on the assumption that poor nations are poor because their governments adopt flawed policies, despite expertise recommending otherwise. Although this assumption may be problematic, in that it boils economic stagnation down to sheer misjudgment, the question of how to render governments accountable to public opinion regarding the future is a valuable one. Futarchy intends to address this by having democratically-elected representatives formally define and manage after-the-fact measurements of national welfare, while allowing market speculators to determine which policies are expected to raise national welfare (Hanson). According to Hanson, “the basic rule of government would be: when a betting market clearly estimates that a proposed policy would increase expected national welfare, that proposal becomes law.”

Hanson was also involved in the creation of the Foresight Exchange (see image), an online play predictions market in which current market prices reflect consensus about the future, and FutureMAP, a (now cancelled) DARPA research project into the use of prediction markets for shaping government policy.

It’s possible to imagine participation in something like the FX as a civic duty in Futarchic societies, and specialized predictions markets emerging around particular issues, geographies, etc. For more information, including Futarchy’s potential shortcomings, refer to “Shall We Vote on Values, but Bet on Beliefs?” and visit Hanson’s website.

Good Magazine ran an interview recently with a man they call The New Nostradamus. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita uses a mathematical model that is based entirely on game theory to predict the outcomes of political conflicts. He takes a very literal interpretation of the phrase “political science” and focuses his analysis strictly on issues of strategic interest, ignoring any cultural or historical aspects of the parties involved. He believes that the theory of rational choice can accurately predict the actions of any political actors as long as the data underpinning the determination of interests are correct. An analysis of his model’s predictive abilities done by the CIA found it to be accurate 90 percent of the time.

In the article a few of his predictions are discussed, but what is interesting is that he also makes a number of prescriptions. In fact, while there is a list at the end of the interview describing some of his accurate predictions, the discussion with him fails to clearly separate predictions from prescriptions. In the interview, he proposes a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and criticizes the outcome of negotiations with Kim Jong-Il of North Korea for not conforming to his model.

Perhaps not coincidentally, the recent agreement that the United States reached with the government of Pyongyang closely resembles the one that Bueno de Mesquita’s model suggested: Kim agrees to dismantle his existing nuclear weapons but not his existing nuclear capability. “He puts it in mothballs with IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspectors on site 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. And in exchange, we provide him with $1.2 billion a year, which we label ‘foreign aid,’ of course.” The “foreign-aid” figure published in the newspapers was $400 million, which concerns Bueno de Mesquita. “I read that and I said, I hope that’s not the deal because it’s not enough money. He needs $1.2 billion, approximately, to sustain the loyalty of his cronies in the military and so forth. It’s unpleasant, this is a nasty man, but we’re stuck with it. The nice part of the deal is that it’s self-enforcing. Each side has a reason to credibly commit to their part of the deal.”

It would appear that what he has actually developed is a highly sophisticated system of conflict mediation. His model assumes that people are selfishly rational and always gravitate toward very predictable terms in an agreement. It would be very interesting to show these predicted outcomes to two negotiating parties at the outset of their talks. Would they get to the same results faster?

Bueno de Mesquita acknowledges the power of what he is able to do with his work, which seems to play a big role in his approach. He will not call elections that he claims to know the outcome for because he does not want to influence them and he will not help organizations affect or manipulate government policy. Clearly, predicting the future is a complicated and controversial venture. It toys with our sense of continuity and our theories of causality, let alone the concept of free-will. It also seems that as people get better at it, we may be raising questions faster than we can answer them.

We have recently resolved Bet 117 on Long Bets about the adjusted cost of energy. It was an interesting case where we had very specific criteria for who would win the bet, yet we could not adjudicate it when the time came. The bettors cited the Department of Energy published numbers to resolve their bet. However in the first quarter of 02006 when the DOE posted their numbers, they then quickly retracted them. It turns out they had several years worth of data incorrect due to the deceptive data from the Enron energy kerfuffle. It took the DOE over a year to straighten it all out. In any case we have yet another resolved bet. Congratulations to Steve Kurtz on winning the bet, and to both bettors who patiently awaited the results, and agreeing quite gentlemanly in the end.

An amazingly in depth article by Long Now board member Paul Saffo on the intracacies of Forecasting appeared in the July 07 Harvard Business Review. The whole issue entitled Going The Distance is about long term thinking in the business realm and is highly recommended. Below are some highlights of Paul’s forcasting article…

The goal of forecasting is not to predict the future but to tell you what you need to know to take meaningful action in the present.

Rule 1: Define a Cone of Uncertainty
Rule 2: Look for the S Curve
Rule 3: Embrace the Things That Don’t Fit
Rule 4: Hold Strong Opinions Weakly
Rule 5: Look Back Twice as Far as You Look Forward
Rule 6: Know When Not to Make a Forecast

Cone of Uncertainty graphic from the sidebar in the article.

For the past few years Chris Hibbert has been working on Zócalo, an Open Source Toolkit for Prediction Markets. He writes, “my purpose in the project is to build prediction market software that people can use as a foundation for deploying many markets of this type. As I said in my proposal to CommerceNet, the plan is to start by building software to support economists doing experiments with prediction markets, and expand from there to internal markets within businesses, and eventually expand to the point where the software would be sufficient for public real-money markets in important questions on technology development, economic impacts, and other important issues” (Hibbert). Essentially, Hibbert believes that by making prediction market software open source and customizable, prediction markets will be more widely used. We are watching this closely as we are considering the same with our Long Bets software.  Build 2007.1 was released April 19, 2007; comments from users are most welcome.

(a screenshot of Zócalo via from sourceforge)

photo of flooded Thames by elyob

The Long Now’s Long Bets project asks us, active bettors and wider public alike, to think more deeply and carefully about the medium- to long-term future than our assumptions (and busy schedules) might otherwise allow.

Nudging our culture towards assuming greater responsibility for addressing (and creating) possible futures is an ambitious undertaking, but the “bet” concept at the core of the project does seem to capture something fundamental about our predicament as creatures gifted — and burdened — with foresight. In some respect, every decision is implicitly a bet, a step taken despite the uncertainty of what comes next. In a 02006 article, Michael Chabon poetically put it this way:

[I]n having children—in engendering them, in loving them, in teaching them to love and care about the world—parents are betting, whether they know it or not, on the Clock of the Long Now. They are betting on their children, and their children after them, and theirs beyond them, all the way down the line from now to 12,006.

Even having kids is a bet, from this angle. Still, there are less lyrical, though deeply significant, bets being placed all the time — and not just on Superbowl Sunday. One relatively new arena for betting explicitly on future possibilities in the world of finance is the catastrophe bond. In April, London’s Financial Times reported a world first:

Investors have been given their first opportunity to bet against the possibility of a disastrous flood crippling business in the City and Canary Wharf, with the sale of the world’s first “flood” bond on capital markets.

The new $150m bond has been issued by an arm of Allianz, the German insurer, to protect itself from devastating claims that might arise from companies affected by such a flood.
…
In recent years, insurance companies have turned increasingly to the capital markets to spread their vulnerabity [sic] to catastrophes, and have already issued bonds whose value is linked to US hurricanes or earthquakes.

However, it has until now been impossible to create flood bonds, because most countries lack precise systems to measure damage.
…
The inaugural issue is worth $150m, but Allianz has in place a programme to issue up to $1bn in the future.

(Gillian Tett and Andrea Felsted, Insurers launch ‘London flood’ bond, Financial Times, 10 April 2007 [online]; 11 April 2007 p. 1 [print edition])

The report describes an interesting trend, of insurers spreading the financial risk associated with natural disasters to the capital markets (in the event of hurricanes, earthquakes, and now floods). A space to watch, in light of increasing concern over extreme weather events caused by climate change. But aside from underlying reasons for the shift (greater volatility?), the key point here is the enabling mechanism — increasing availability of ways to measure increments of disaster. What can be measured can be bet on. Those who follow Long Bets will know that adjudicability of bets is one of the key questions for long bettors. Rhetorically grand, but forensically fuzzy, claims are Long Bets’ bête noire. They run into the bar of adjudicability (and hence accountability) deliberately raised by the project. What we see here is that risks which can be specified and measured with sufficient precision become subject to the gaming of financiers. And it seems that, if and as technologies for quantifying natural processes improve and become more widespread, the pool of events we can rigorously bet on, in the world of finance or otherwise, will continue to grow.

Perhaps not just large-scale natural events, but other things (internal bodily processes? social dynamics of organisations or countries?) could become quantifiable, hence “bettable” — a site of unprecedented accountability. What might this mean in the long run for how risk is managed in society?

Philip Tetlock (screen shot from high-res Seminar video at members’ webpage)

Philip Tetlock recently presented a Seminar About Long-Term Thinking to the effect that confident forecasters ought to be ignored. Despite his research showing the profound unreliability of such speculation, it’s rare to find even a moderately systematic evaluation of political forecasts in the popular media. In this category comes an article from the online version of Radar magazine earlier this year, “The Iraq Gamble”, which scrutinises journalistic commentators’ predictions about the war in Iraq. In it, writer Jebediah Reed tracks the fortunes of predictions against those of the predictors, and is disturbed by what turns up.

[M]aybe something is amiss in the world of punditry. Are the incentives well-aligned? Surely those who warned us not to invade Iraq have been recognized and rewarded, and those who pushed for this disaster face tattered credibility and waning career prospects. Could it be any other way in America?
…
So we selected the four pundits who were in our judgment the most influentially and disturbingly misguided in their pro-war arguments and the four who were most prescient and forceful in their opposition.
…
Then we did a career check … and found that something is rotten in the fourth estate.

The suggestion is that American meritocracy seems to be in trouble when it comes to the careers of political pundits. Eight journalists’ profiles are presented under two headings: “Getting rich by being wrong”, and “Right but poor”. As one of those drafted into the latter category, Jonathan Schell, remarks: “There doesn’t seem to be a rush to find the people who were right about Iraq and install them in the mainstream media.” Meanwhile, certain confident voices have prevailed despite the question marks over their track record (a similar point is made in an article from FAIR.org last year, addressing the Iraq-related statements of columnist Thomas Friedman, who also comes into the firing line in the Radar piece).

Whether or not one agrees with the argument as applied to this politically contentious topic — and a larger sample would be required to draw firm conclusions — it seems clear that improving accountability (i.e., correspondence of reputation and record) for predictions made by public figures remains a major challenge in politics and the media alike. It’s an aspiration embedded in the Long Bets project, and any readers who think they can do as well as, or better than, these guys — on any topic of public interest — is encouraged to test their long-term prescience by placing a wager on the site.

The online version of Popular Science magazine is offering a prediction market for science and technology. It uses token dollars instead of real money (in order to avoid gambling laws). Here is what they say about it:

Ready to bet on the future?
Join the PopSci Predictions Exchange.

Welcome to the PPX, the first place to bet on the future of science and technology. It’s easy and free: Log on, and we’ll give you POP$250,000 in our virtual PopSci Dollars. Use that money to buy propositions you think are likely to happen. If other traders also want to buy, that proposition’s price will go up, and you’ll make PopSci bucks. Expand your portfolio with bets on energy, space, consumer technology and extreme science, and compete against other players for prizes and bragging rights.

Here is a sample chart from bets on whether Internet Radio Survives